Corrupção, cultura política e capital social negativo no Brasil by Baquero, Marcello
[REVISTA DEBATES, Porto Alegre, v. 9, n. 2, p. 139-157, mai.-ago. 2015] 
 
Corruption, political culture and negative social capital in 
Brazil 





One of the problems in strengthening Brazilian democracy has been the endurance of continued 
corruption on the part of state officials. The result has been the institutionalization of a political 
culture, which shows a growing alienation, and apathy of citizens regarding politics. This behavior has 
its origins in citizens´ perception that the state and public authorities cannot be trusted producing an 
inertial democracy with low stocks of social capital. The purpose of this paper is to examine the 
relationship between corruption practices by state authorities and the structuring of a defective 
political culture in Brazil. The working hypothesis is that serious cases of institutionalized corruption 
are possible due to invisible social ties created among public authorities, producing social capital of a 
negative nature, which constraints the effective advancements in Brazilian democracy. 
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Resumo 
Um dos problemas no fortalecimento da democracia brasileira é a continuada corrupção de gestores 
públicos e políticos. O resultado se manifesta na institucionalização de uma cultura política que mostra 
uma crescente alienação e apatia dos cidadãos em relação à política. Esse comportamento tem sua 
origem na percepção dos cidadãos de que as autoridades públicas não podem ser confiadas, 
produzindo uma democracia inercial com baixos níveis de capital social. O objetivo deste trabalho é 
examinar a relação entre as práticas de corrupção pelas autoridades eleitas com a estruturação de uma 
cultura política defeituosa no Brasil. A hipótese de trabalho é de que casos graves de corrupção 
institucionalizada são possíveis em virtude dos laços sociais invisíveis criados entre as autoridades 
públicas. Neste sentido, o capital social, de natureza negativa constrange avanços substantivos na 
democracia brasileira. 
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Introduction 
When Brazilian politics is analyzed, the word corruption invariable emerges 
as a relevant factor. According to the Corruption Index of International 
Transparency, Brazil ranked from 2012 to 2014 in the 69th position out of 175 
countries (TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL, 2014). It is not surprising then 
that corruption and politics directly correlate, influencing government performance 
and consequently eroding democratic principles and aggravating the chronic 
problems of poverty and social inequality. Research (LATINOBARÓMETRO, 
2005-2010) has consistently shown that Brazilians believe that governments are 
unresponsive to their needs and they frequently hold politics and politicians in low 
esteem.  Thus, distrust in government and politicians are prominent. This situation 
has placed the theme of unveiling citizen´s attitudes and behavior related to public 
official’s practice of corruption as a priority in the agenda of political scientists. 
Corruption can foster a “culture of distrust” that diminishes confidence in political 
institutions, encourages harsher evaluations of the performance of the political system 
and makes citizens less trusting of civil servants (BLAIS, GIDENGIL and 
KILIBARDA, 2014). This context leads me to formulate the following research 
question: is institutional corruption a permanent component of Brazilian political 
culture, and how it affects the attitudes and behavior of citizens towards democracy 
and politics?  
Specifically, I analyze citizen’s political perceptions of corruption, their trust 
in political institutions and the satisfaction with democracy performance. The 
objective is to assess if these perceptions influence the type of social capital that 
materializes. I believe that citizen’s perception of corruption, in countries such as 
Brazil, might explain democratic backwardness or the institutionalization of an 
inertial democracy, which presents an asymmetry between formal democratic 
advancements and stagnation in political development and the delay in strengthening 
an assertive political culture (DALTON and WELZEL, 2015). I postulate that 
historical-structural factors produced an indifferent political culture in Brazil 
permitting the institutionalization of harmful factors that promote the practice of 
corruption and produce negative social capital among state authorities. 
This paper utilizes descriptive statistics from surveys collected by several 
sources such as Corrupciometro (INEA, 2005), and Latino Barometer in 2009. I 
intend to contribute to the literature by examining the relationship between citizen’s 
perception of corruption and satisfaction or not with democratic performance. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 1 analyzes how corruption is 
defined. Section 2 discusses the theoretical bases of political culture and its relation to 
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democratic construction process. Section 3 contextualizes corruption to the Brazilian 
case, highlighting the structural-historical legacies that discouraged citizen’s political 
involvement producing a passive, hybrid and indifferent political culture. Section 4 
presents the conclusions. 
Defining corruption 
            In the last decades, the word “disaffected democracies” both in new and old 
democracies has gained visibility (PHARR and PUTNAM, 2000). In these types of 
democracies trust in government and political institutions has eroded. Citizens 
increasingly have come to believe that governments are unresponsive to their needs 
generating hostile and disaffected evaluations of government officials’ political 
performance. This perception has fostered a culture of distrust and generated a 
democratic malaise, aggravated by the perception of government-institutionalized 
corruption. 
The damaging effects of corruption on the development of an effective 
democracy are widely known. Most studies about corruption point out the severe 
impact in the implementation of public policy (ROSE-ACKERMAN, 1999; TANZI 
and DAVOODI, 1998), and from the point of view of democracy, the decreasing 
citizens’ trust in public institutions, politicians and political parties (VAN DER 
MEER, 2010; SCHWARZ-BLUM, 2006), and ultimately their support for 
democracy (SELIGSON, 2002; MOISÉS, 2010). 
The World Bank has defined corruption in relation “to public officials’ abuse 
for private benefits”. For the Transparency Institute, corruption refers to the “bad use 
of power directed to obtain private benefits”. Despite eventual supposed benefits of 
corruption on improving bureaucratic efficiency, presently the practice of corruption 
is widely believed to be inimical to an environment facilitating self-sustaining growth 
and development (DREHER and HERZFELD, 2008). 
From a functional point of view, corruption affect social, political and 
economic relations of a given society, acting as a substitute for political participation. 
Political corruption is a secret practice of a national network, which has specific 
visibilities. The secrecy allows the arbitrarily deviation of the monopoly of legitimate 
violence to the use of power, for private benefits. In this sense, sometimes corruption 
is considered as something normal because it guarantees a free game, necessary for 
societies’ good functioning. 
From an ethical point of view, political elites create their own ethics code 
based on their ideology that promotes “loyalty” and “solidarity” among them, in 
other words, negative social capital. This type of social capital undermines the 
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prospects of the institutionalization of a substantive democracy at the same speed that 
formal democratic advances have experienced. Thus, the corollaries of political 
corruption materialize in: (1) benefits for the network members; (2) a growing 
distance between the elites and citizens; (3) the emergence of personal scape goats 
that assume individually the culpability of acts of corruption that refer to the whole 
system, and (4) a pact of silence shared by everyone and necessary for the system’s 
preservation.    
Thus, from the perspective of social capital, both in the positive and negative 
dimension the effects are relevant and deserve scrutiny. From the negative point of 
view, it promotes institutionalized corruption, providing the basis for opportunistic 
behavior/corruption to occur, while from a positive dimension, trust and reciprocity 
are central elements for combating the “free rider” problem (WARREN, 2001). 
The ethics of corruption include illegal actions that are in the threshold of 
being legal and legitimate for they have apparently consistent justifications. These 
activities refer to public price biding, constructions, and social and industrial projects 
and, the use of public resources to achieve majorities in Congress in the name of 
governability. 
When corruption is analyzed from an economic point of view, the premise 
has been that political and generalized trust are achieved when high levels of 
development are present because these factors diminish corruption practices 
(USLANER, 2004). Thus, political systems that have a consolidated democracy have 
mechanisms that hold politicians accountable for corrupt behavior, mainly through a 
set of checks and balances among branches of government, law enforcement, and 
voting in elections. In this sense, accountability brings positive benefits for the 
control of corruption. In the case of Brazil, however, political liberalization according 
to some authors (WEYLAND, 1998; WHITEHEAD, 2000) has not reduced 
significantly corruption; instead, new forms of corruption have sprung up. 
Some studies argue that corruption is highly damaging for democracy and has 
negative effects on the economy and diminishes citizens support for democracy 
(BOOTH and SELIGSON, 2009; CARLIN et al., 2013), it generates clientelistic 
relationships (NINO, 1992) and affects society’s social morale (ESTÉVEZ, 2005). 
For Nye (1990, p.963) “corruption is the behavior of public officials that deviates 
from normal responsibilities based upon private reasons (family and friends) of a 
financial nature or upgrading of social status”. According to Suárez, Jabbaz e Isuani 
(2001) corruption presupposes the existence of a network of actors and organizations 
that operate at different levels, establishing transactional processes that imply some 
type of transgressor attitude and a pact of silence, in other words, the phenomenon of 
Corruption, political culture and negative social capital in Brazil | 143 
corruption becomes naturalized as a “normal way of doing things” in society, 
institutions and organizations. 
Furthermore, Elster (1989), Thompson (1995) e Rose-Ackerman (2001) have 
developed studies that consider corruption an element that breaks the connection 
between collective action and citizen’s power, in order to influence collective 
decisions through the debate and the vote, central elements of democracy. 
Corruption creates, therefore, deficiencies in public services, not only in the form of 
tax evasion but by the substitution of public activities for those actions that involve 
material gains derived from this practice. In this perspective, corruption undermines 
the constitution of a culture of democracy because people tend to develop attitudes of 
distrust of public officials and core political institutions. Citizens have become aware 
that corruption withdraws resources from economic growth and policies to improve 
people’s quality of life through the abuse of public power to obtain personal gains 
(NYE, 1967).  
Power abuses and, consequently of citizen’s trust to obtain private rewards, 
materializes in varied forms beyond the monetary dimension. Corruption can 
materialize in practices of nepotism, clientelism, favoring specific groups and 
individuals in cases of conflict of interests, frauds and, above all, the “state’s capture”. 
This latter point refers to an action that occurs when interest groups in a political 
system literally assume the control of the state, privileging private interests in 
detriment of public interest. 
            Corruption can also appear in the designing of public policies and involve the 
violation of second order routines (non-written guidelines that determine how 
politicians should take just, egalitarian and impartial decisions). It can also take place 
in a bureaucratic context, which involves political policies implementation, and refers 
to the violation of first order norms (written rules and laws that are the result of the 
failure of the decision process of politicians) (WARREN, 2004).  
At the level of society, corruption emerges and becomes naturalized as a result 
of institutionalized political corruption. Both in the political context and in the 
societal case, corruption materializes in the form of extortion, frauds, nepotism and 
favoring practices that occur within organizations that are independent of 
government control. In sum, corruption is a complex concept that incorporates a 
varied set of conducts that occur in different contexts within the state and society. 
What is common in the practice of corruption is the distortion or violation of 
established norms and rules socially accepted that guide public officials and citizen’s 
behavior. 
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However, Warren (2004) when comparing to other political pathologies such 
as political violence, authoritarianism, political stagnation and oppression, considers 
political corruption to be the lesser evil. This perception probably explains why 
democratic theory has dedicated reduced attention to this theme. In fact some 
authors have suggested that some corruption is inherent to democracy and have a 
positive impact because reduces the transaction costs, bureaucratic inefficiencies and, 
in a general sense, “makes things happen” (HUNTINGTON, 1968, p. 59; LEYS, 
1965). I disagree of those assessments, especially when the developing economies are 
studied. The main question in these countries is not whether corruption is a lesser 
evil compared with other pathologies, but what social investment can be achieved 
with public resources withdrawn through corruption. 
Whether corruption is evaluated in a positive or negative direction, I argue 
that the consequences are negative in the structuring of a democratic political culture 
in Brazil. The first evidence that I utilize in the next section is of a historical-cultural 
nature. 
Political culture and democracy 
The central concept that guides this article is that the type of political culture 
that materializes in a society derives from citizen´s perception of corruption. How 
people view politics influence their insertion in political issues and their orientations 
and beliefs about politics and political institutions. The main reference of this 
approach is Almond and Verba (1963) The civic culture. In their survey study of five 
nations, which served as the basis of political culture analysis, they defined political 
culture as the process through which citizen´s political orientations and attitudes are 
structured. For them, the emergence of a new political culture permeated by political 
participation can manifest either as democratic or authoritarian regimes (ALMOND 
and VERBA, 1963). In this dichotomy, the democratic state offers the citizens the 
opportunity of making part of the decision making process, whereas in an 
authoritarian situation citizens are seen as mere “participant subjects”. In this sense, 
the democratic model requires more than the mere existence of formal institutions, 
because these same institutions are present in totalitarian regimes. The difference 
between a democratic and authoritarian regime is that the former requires a 
democratic political culture (ALMOND and VERBA, 1963). The authors point out 
that political culture establishes links with historical factors of a political system, 
which generate specific characteristics that influence attitudinal and behavioral 
political predispositions of citizens. 
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Almond and Verba elaborate, in this perspective, a classification of citizens’ 
political orientations, dividing them, for analytical purposes, in three types: (a) 
cognitive; (b) affective and (c) evaluative. Besides the authors call attention to the fact 
that political self-esteem, that is a self-evaluation about the relevance that citizens 
believe they have in the scenario of politics, interferes in political attitudinal and 
behavioral predispositions: as this self-esteem increases, the more interested and will 
to participate in politics (ALMOND and VERBA, 1963). This premise points out to 
the role of subjective political efficacy, in which people manifest their perception 
about whether they consider worth getting involved in politics. Political efficacy 
refers to the sentiment that people have that their political representatives “listen” to 
their demands and are responsive to them, stimulating them to become active 
participants in the political process.  
Directing this analysis to the Brazilian case, it can be noted that a relatively 
consolidated democratic regime in the poliarquic sense coexists with democratic 
instability and high levels of social inequality. The population faces material deficits, 
such as poverty, wage inequalities and wealth concentration, unemployment and 
serious gaps in health assistance, as well as the increasing rate of violence and 
insecurity. These problems signals that formal procedures, although necessaries have 
not been sufficient to resolve citizens essential material problems, which, instead tend 
to worsen. In this scenario the distance between state and society creates a vicious 
cycle that provide the spaces for the emergence of corrupt political practices at all 
levels of society. This does not suggest that norms, laws and procedures are not 
relevant. Institutions are indispensable and central for a democratic system; however, 
it is imperative that a participant political culture also be present. In this way, it must 
be highlighted the need to understand how the practice of corruption undermines 
democratic principles. How to institutionalize a culture guided by republican 
principles in a society characterized by authoritarian enclaves and a historical legacy 
that tends to weaken the relationship between state and society, is one of the main 
challenges of Brazilian democratic construction.  
Historical-structural roots of corruption in Brazil  
Most studies in Brazil point out the historical culture of corruption as being 
responsible for the recurrence of these practices. Although, other factors are also 
relevant to understand institutionalized corruption, I believe that in order to evaluate 
the reasons that produce corruption in Brazil is compelling to identify the historical 
legacies that contributed to generate a political culture that has naturalized this 
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practice. Some obvious mechanisms such as culture or legal traditions are likely to 
predict corruption directly in societies politically unstable, such as Brazil. 
Brazilian historical formation, in terms of state and citizenship formation, 
created a gradual indifference and apathy of the population regarding politics in 
general. This process was identified by Carvalho (1996) as a process of 
institutionalization of a state-citizenship (estadania), which refers to the primacy of 
the state in the structuring civil society´s social life, contrary to the society structuring 
the state as in the European experience.   
The primacy of the state in society’s organization, since the colonial period, 
was marked by a strong patrimonialistic public administration, transforming 
government organization in something “more of a good to be explored”, rather than 
a functional structure oriented to benefit the public interest” (PAES DE PAULA, 
2005, p. 106). This situation extended from the period of the Empire until the Old 
Republic (1889-1930). 
For the historian José Murilo de Carvalho (1996) this period marked the 
advancement of the state in the direction of co-opting and regulating society, seeking 
to rationalize burocratize and establish secular social relations, underestimating 
popular manifestations. Therefore, the initiatives of the state to regulate social 
relations and establishing social control in this period circumscribed to military 
enlistment and civil registering. This regulation, according to Carvalho provided the 
formatting of a citizenship “from top to bottom” with the predominance of a 
political culture of the subject type, that is, a political system in which people 
interact, but those interactions do not produce political efficacy nor do they stimulate 
political participation. In this context, the emergence of a “negative citizenship” 
prospers. Through the initiative of the state, citizenship extended to citizens; 
however, this citizenship was oriented to increase the control of the life of the “new 
citizens”. 
In the 1930’s, the concept of citizenship was associated to the incorporation 
of social and working rights conceded by Getúlio Vargas government. For Santos 
(1979), this established a Brazilian citizenship as a regulated citizenship, not based on 
political values, but rather in a system of occupational stratification, in other words, 
all the members of a community that are localized in any of the occupations 
recognized and defined in law (SANTOS, 1979, p. 75). 
Insofar as political parties are concerned, they did not construct a national 
identification system, rather it became an elite affair. The state created, 
simultaneously, a regulated citizenship and political parties associated to the state 
more than to society. In this sense, the Vargas government transformed the 
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opposition party – União Democrática Nacional – in a liberal party, and the coup 
d’etat of 1964, demonstrated the intention of affirming the primacy of the state over 
society, which strengthened the characteristics of an authoritarian and elitist political 
culture. This historical process, therefore, fostered the separation between the state 
and the citizen, identified by Motta (2007) as the “we – them” syndrome, where 
significant segments of society see their public representatives as belonging to another 
type of class. 
These historical aspects of the relationship between state and society in the 
Brazilian political system generated a dynamic where political and social rights were 
“conceded” by the state, and not conquered by the citizens. The relationships 
between the people and the power holders throughout history shows a permanent 
subordination of citizens to the state excess of authoritarianism. These characteristics 
have produced among state officials a sense of impunity with practices of corruption 
in public administration, and a sense in society that nothing can be done about it. 
The consequence was the institutionalization of a state that is formally democratic, 
but socially stagnated, constraining citizen’s civic empowerment.  Thus, citizenship 
evolution in Brazil follows a contrary direction than the one suggested by Marshall 
(1967), which postulates that citizenship construction based on the chronological 
order: civil rights, political rights and social rights.  In the Brazilian case, according to 
Carvalho (2001) citizenship constituted “from the top to bottom”. In the same 
direction for Sérgio Buarque de Holanda (1969), there exists in the genesis of 
Brazilian culture the roots of a state patrimonialism, which generates the figure of the 
Brazilian cordial man that is incapable of distinguishing between the private and 
public interest. 
Under these circumstances, the history of Brazilian political culture marked 
by patrimonialism and individualism obstructed the differentiation between public 
and private spheres, facilitating corruption practices within and without public 
institutions. Oliveira Vianna (1982) argues that Brazilian population political 
formation resulted of the influence of the Portuguese Metropolis and not by people’s 
free choice to aggregate. The first villages created by a central power with 
characteristics of a family environment and not by a sense of public collectivity 
emerged. What prevailed were the political clans that Vianna defined as small groups 
of individuals (aristocratic and dominant elite) that influenced life’s practical 
decisions based upon particular interests.   
For anthropologist Roberto Da Matta (1997), in order to comprehend 
Brazilian reality is important to utilize two sociological categories “the house” and 
“the street”. These categories go beyond the place of designation; rather they 
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constitute moral entities, social spheres of action. The house becomes the stage for 
the more feudal powerful families that command pieces of society and are the true 
protagonists of Brazilian social history. Da Matta’s suggests that the perception of 
public officials and the political elite of the state as an extension of the house or a 
“big family”, where obeying hierarchy to the “family leader” prevails making public 
life an extension of the house. Thus, creating an illusion of the presence of honesty of 
purposes, and specially a compromise with the people (p. 10). 
Da Matta further argues that the existence of a differentiated order system 
that constructs and reconstructs Brazilian social experience, takes into account that, 
within the house, anything is possible, which is not the case for the street. In the 
house context, our presence is called for. This is not possible in the context of the 
street that is why Da Matta defines individuals as super citizens. The individuals in a 
negative sense are “sub citizens”, because in the context of the street are anonymous 
and submitted to authorities and do not possess voice. The behavior in the street is of 
disrespect, because everything that stays outside the house is a government 
problem. (DA MATTA, 1997, p. 12). 
Dealing with the public space as something private is a historical trace of 
Brazilian colonial inheritance. This affected the political culture because 
institutionalized the practice of corruption that took place, for example, in 1981, 
having Paulo Maluf governor of São Paulo as the central figure of this scandal 
(BARROS JR., 1982). 
The recurrent cases of corruption reflect the instable environment of Brazilian 
society, which unveil gradually the permissiveness, irresponsibility, government’s 
official’s impunity and the passivity of the governed (BARROS JR., 1982, p. 9). 
Above all, these cases reveal the ethics of impunity of the criminal when a crime is 
committed supported by economic and political power and that the Brazilian society 
has naturalized. 
In an analysis of Brazilian corruption, Dickson M. Grael (1986), identified in 
President Geisel’s government a famous case of corruption in 1976, known as “the 
Saraiva Report”. Grael describes the disappointment of the nation with the military 
government insofar as corruption and subversion control were concerned. During 
this period both corruption and suppression affected public and private political 
liberties (GRAEL, 1986, p. 9). The “Saraiva Report” publicized the accusations of 
Francisco Pinto in 1978, a lawyer that utilized a report sent by Coronel Raimundo 
Saraiva Martins, ex-military attaché in France. In this report, the lawyer accused the 
ex-ambassador of Brazil in Paris, Delfim Neto, of receiving bribes from transactions 
between the Brazilian government and French suppliers. After those accusations, the 
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Ministry of the Army refused to install an Inquiry Parliamentary Commission that 
would allow everyone to have access to the documents sent by the ex-diplomatic 
attaché, and according to Grael the case was not clearly explained. In sum, the 
“Delfim-Saraiva” case revealed a historical moment of corruption in which the 
military government arbitrarily and in an authoritarian manner denied the nation the 
right to information of facts related to corruption at the official level (GRAEL, 1986, 
p. 24). 
            In the beginning of the 1990’s, the most notorious case of corruption and 
that was responsible for the impeachment of the ex-president Fernando Collor de 
Mello occurred. However, this case is somewhat out of the historical pattern 
characterized by the non-punishment of the involved in cases of corruption. 
The impeachment occurred because of a combination of a weak coalition in the 
support for Collor and by the strong hostility of a significant segment of the 
population by the tentative of implementing a political reform by imposition. 
            In 2005, the case that generated global repercussion and became known as 
the mensalão (illegal monthly side-payments from the executive’s office to legislators), 
occurred in President Lula’s government. This scandal produced a more negative 
effect, because it came from the Worker’s Party regular members, whom when in the 
opposition always defended a government conduct of ethics and condemned 
corruption practices of the “old politics”. 
More recently, the case known as the Lava Jato (deviation of resources from 
the main national petroleum company – PETROBRAS – for paying bribes to 
politicians in order to secure contracts within the realm of the politicians concerned) 
produced a national commotion. The investigation has advanced and produced for 
the first time in Brazil, a series of arrests and jailing of public figures and CEO of 
private construction companies. They were also required to return public resources 
obtained illegally from bribes and embezzlement.  This case, however, is far from 
over and could have serious repercussions in the political and economic stability of 
the country.  
Taylor (2010) affirms that corruption remains as one of the main problems of 
Brazil, because it affects not only the economy performance, but also the level of 
institutional trust. These cases of corruption lend credibility to the argument of 
Taylor (2010) whom argues that corruption in Brazil take place in all levels of 
government. The evidence to corroborate this affirmation are numerous. Whereas in 
the beginning of the 1990’s a group of bureaucrats deviated approximately 3 billion 
dollars from the social security system, more recently was discovered the 
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disappearance of 1 million dollars from the Federal Police in Rio de Janeiro 
(TAYLOR, 2010). 
            Corruption also is entrenched in the Brazilian state at the individual level of 
the bureaucracy. Despite the lower scale of this type of corruption, it has grave 
consequences for Brazilian democracy. The case of the Chinese-Brazilian Law Kin 
Chong, arrested in 2007 because of a scheme of contraband of electronic devices 
facilitated by the police, is a good example of this type of corruption (TAYLOR, 
2010). 
            Deserves attention also the fact that the patterns of corruption are not 
constant because some bureaucratic sectors are more susceptible to this practice. The 
more common involvements are extortion (soliciting of bribes), nepotism (hiring 
relatives for public posts), and also by the suspect relationships with the private sector 
that donates financial resources not accountable, and that is known as “caixa 2” (the 
use of resources which origin is not known) for electoral campaigns. The 
practitioners of this type of corruption consider this action as a rational practice, as a 
survival strategy in an environment in which competition with those that practice 
bribes and evade taxes becomes impracticable. These practices naturalized what has 
become known as the “jeitinho brasileiro” (the Brazilian way of doing things). 
            Corruption also has effects of economic and political nature. The economic 
effects are of a significant magnitude, directly or indirectly, because it involves the 
deviation of resources from strategic social areas such as education, security, health, 
housing and social inequality. From the political arena perspective, the effects 
manifest in the form of a negative perception of citizens of politics and political 
institutions, materialized in cynicism, indifference and the gradual reciprocal 
distancing between state and society. In this manner, it reinforces the deleterious 
traditional political practices such as the jeitinho, and the use of the political 
institutions for private benefits. One of the phrases that became popular in Brazil 
refers to the idea that “rouba, mas faz”, that is, that it is all right to vote for 
candidates “that steal but make things happen”. Another informal manner of 
accepting corruption in Brazil is through the “Gerson Law” (Lei de Gérson), based 
on the principle that taking advantage of everything is permissible (TAYLOR, 2010). 
            The results of these historical traces were empirically shown by the research of 
the Latin American Anti-Corruption Institute (INEA, 2005), which indicated that 
Brazil was the only country considered as having pernicious corruption in political 
parties. This type of corruption of social perniciousness imply high costs and damages 
to the country’s development, affecting especially the social morale and the civic 
duties of social life (INEA, 2005, p. 3). In a scale from 1 to 11, where 1 means the 
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absence of corruption and 11 refers to pernicious corruption, Brazil was classified as 9 
(normative corruption), 10 (administrative corruption) and 11 in pernicious 
corruption (the total sum of normative and administrative corruption). All these 
types of corruption affect negatively the political culture of the country.  
Thus, cultural factors and public opinion research assume centrality to 
understand Brazilian politics, where formal democratic procedures need to be 
complemented with other mediating mechanisms that give the political system the 
necessary legitimacy to function well. As a democratic regime faces obstacles in 
providing efficient answers to the population demands, the tendency in terms of 
beliefs, attitudes and behavior of people goes in the direction of disappointment, 
which strengthens the authoritarian nature of public officials. To illustrate this point, 
data from Latinobarometro in 2009, showed that 61% of Brazilians agreed that the 
military could intervene in politics to remove a president that does not obey the 
Constitution. These answers signal a dangerous predisposition of citizens in believing 
that authoritarian solutions based on force, despite the existence of an 
institutionalized framework, could resolve economic and social problems in times of 
crisis (GONZÁLEZ, 2011). 
It has become widely accepted hat corruption scandals are one of the factors 
that can generate political distrust (POWER and JAMISON, 2005). In this type of 
scenario, citizens show low levels of political efficacy and are cynic regarding 
democracy, compromising its consolidation. Table 1 shows the degree of distrust of 
Brazilians in political institutions and their satisfaction with democracy’s 
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Table 1 – Distrust of Brazilians in political institutions 1996-2010 













Argentina 75,05 84,72 65,32 67,36 50,69 70,74 76,04 30,90 63,46 
Bolívia 74,79 85,64 65,93 66,76 64,56 73,78 74,07 37,55 69,17 
Brazil 71,09 81,37 60,41 64,44 57,50 62,82 56,97 49,65 68,77 
Colombia 74,47 82,20 59,27 57,40 54,13 66,52 65,86 46,40 69,95 
Costa Rica 65,99 78,27 64,19 60,48 60,18 62,96 54,56 34,90 43,34 
Chile 63,29 77,85 45,98 54,74 40,28 58,04 67,29 40,05 60,42 
Equador 84,20 88,54 72,05 66,74 76,37 72,66 81,31 54,00 71,69 
Salvador 68,94 75,04 58,78 62,56 59,36 64,10 67,37 58,85 60,07 
Guatemala 77,76 82,04 75,04 68,72 72,52 76,98 74,18 53,05 66,76 
Honduras 64,88 77,94 67,26 60,90 59,31 73,00 65,49 51,15 61,80 
México 70,18 78,23 70,17 69,54 61,73 69,78 73,16 45,85 72,85 
Nicaragua 76,90 81,70 72,49 70,86 77,08 77,16 74,04 47,30 66,33 
Panama 75,61 77,65 65,16 65,64 62,37 67,68 69,79 38,65 60,76 
Paraguai 74,14 80,80 63,35 54,16 70,48 68,34 74,26 61,70 82,79 
Peru 80,29 84,35 76,72 72,22 73,98 77,02 82,15 56,00 80,14 
Uruguai 51,74 63,10 49,68 43,50 50,96 47,34 47,96 18,85 35,89 
Venezuela 61,89 72,94 53,43 57,10 48,60 60,52 61,99 20,45 53,51 
América 
Latina 71,28 79,67 63,38 62.04 60,42 66,60 67,81 43,00 62.50 
Source: Latinobarómetro, 1996-2010.  
 
The data from table 1 indicate that distrust of political institutions is a Latin 
American phenomenon. In the case of Brazil, the most distrusted institutions are 
political parties (81%), Congress (71%) and government (60%). This finding is not 
surprising given the historical and cultural context and their impact in the process of 
a construction of a political culture highly cynic and distrustful of their elected 
representatives and the institutions that mediate their demands to the state. 
In this context, one of the questions that assume centrality refers to the 
pattern of Brazilians perceptions about corruption. The question utilized was “how 
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Table 2 – Perception of progress in the reduction of corruption in state institutions in the last two 
years (2010) 
Country A lot Some Little Nothing 
Argentina 2,60% 18,70% 38,00% 40,60% 
Bolívia 8,20% 30,50% 37,00% 24,30% 
Brazil 6,70% 35,20% 39,80% 18,30% 
Chile 5,30% 40,40% 41,20% 13,00% 
Colombia 13,10% 35,00% 32,40% 19,50% 
Costa Rica 11,10% 31,50% 34,40% 23,00% 
Ecuador 5,80% 44,80% 36,10% 13,30% 
El Salvador 3,70% 30,50% 43,60% 22,20% 
Guatemala 5,80% 14,50% 38,30% 41,50% 
Honduras 10,50% 23,00% 30,40% 36,10% 
México 5,00% 27,60% 37,70% 29,70% 
Nicaragua 14,20% 20,30% 36,00% 29,50% 
Panamá 14,30% 40,70% 28,50% 16,60% 
Paraguay 6,50% 30,40% 35,50% 27,60% 
Peru 1,80% 20,50% 37,30% 40,40% 
Uruguay 12,20% 46,50% 27,80% 13,50% 
Venezuela 6,60% 31,80% 25,00% 36,60% 
América Latina 7,85% 30,70% 35,24% 26,22% 
Source: Latinobarometro, 2010. 
  
The data from Table 2 consistent with the theoretical argument and the data 
presented in Table 1, which suggest that when the levels of distrust are high, so are 
the efforts to restraint the practice of corruption. Brazilians are not too optimistic 
about initiatives that seek to reduce corruption, as almost 60% of the interviewed 
responded that these efforts are too little (40%) or non-existent (18%). 
These results are consistent with other studies that established a relationship 
between corruption and institutional functioning of democracy (POWER and 
JAMISON, 2005). These studies suggested and were confirmed in this paper that 
distrust in political institutions affects how citizens evaluate their role in politics and 
their perception of corruption. This premise suggests that as parties fail in 
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aggregating and articulating the demands of the population, the vote becomes a type 
of merchandise disputed in the political market. In this way, the vote loses its 
representative nature because people choose their representatives based not on 
institutions of political mediation, but on the figure of the candidate, in other words 
it institutionalizes personalism (BAQUERO, 1984; FERREIRA, 1984).  
 In this sense, what is important to remember is that the authoritarian past, 
not just in Brazil, but also in all of Latin America, has left a legacy that has helped to 
naturalize the practice of corruption at all levels of the political system. In Brazil 
citizens perceive corruption as being part of the political and society game, which in 
my opinion produces a weak political culture and democratic institutions. 
Conclusion 
 The Brazilian State, throughout its history, has structured a vertical, top-
down elaborated political structure. Contrary to inclusion of citizens and their 
interests in its performance, what seems to count are the agreements among elites and 
pork-barrel alliances, oriented to benefit minority interests. This results, on one 
hand, by the presence of a vicious circle of political apathy, lack of participation and 
reduced sense of citizenship and, on the other hand, by the presence of old political 
practices that compromise democratic principles, strengthening instead relationships 
based on clientelism, patrimonialim, personalism and uncontrolled self-interested use 
of public goods. 
In this context of institutional weakness and a mutual indifference between 
civil society and the State, the probability of the actions of new incumbents goes in 
the direction of repeating corruption practices. There are several incentives to 
politicians to engage in activities that seek the embezzlement of public resources, and 
the use of public goods as private means in exchange of votes in search for re-election. 
Those practices damage severely the legitimacy of democracy, because the citizens 
trust neither the government nor the institutions. Thus, the citizens become fragile in 
a world where they go from primary to tertiary relations without strong and effective 
organizations, capable of channeling collective demands. At the same time, patterns 
of alienation, apathy and distrust in democracy become institutionalized as they 
consider the regime as a synonym of corruption. 
In a context of that nature, seeking a solid democracy beyond formal 
procedures requires the development of mechanisms that effectively control and 
punish corruption practices, whether they originate in the state or society. It has 
become consensual that democracy should go beyond the formal dimension that is, it 
should not be only a method of choosing candidates, but an effective component of 
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constructing a civic political culture. The battle against corruption constitutes a basic 
element to achieve this type of political culture. This process involves not only public 
judgments and punishment of corrupt politicians, but also the development of 
mechanisms that help to create a virtuous circle of citizenship, and participation. 
These elements could be capable to help with the reorganization of demands of 
different branches of society and to press public representatives to be more 
responsible and accountable in public administration and the promotion of positive 
social capital  
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